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Digital Polyopoly
Barbora JEDLIČKOVÁ
The digital economy has significantly changed many aspects of our lives, including the way firms
do business and compete with each other. In addition to the benefits the digital world has
introduced, it has also brought challenges for competition law, including new ways to restrict
competition, with computing algorithms representing one of the most prominent examples.
Algorithms can lead to, facilitate and maintain anticompetitive collusion, and one of the most
pressing tests for competition law and its enforcement in the digital world is algorithmic parallel
conduct. The terminology introduced for this conduct in this article is ‘digital polyopoly’. Digital
polyopolies encompass conditions similar to oligopolies, in particular, interdependency and
transparency. However, unlike parallel conduct arising from oligopolies, digital polyopolies are
not limited by their number of competitors. This new phenomenon requires fitted interpretation
and rethinking of existing competition-law and economic concepts. What digital polyopolies are,
how they differ from pre-digital era concepts and how competition law should tackle them (with a
particular emphasis on the European Union competition law’s concept of ‘concerted practice’), are
questions explored in this article.
1 INTRODUCTION
The digital world we live in is characterized by many features, including new
technologies, global and fast connectivity and artificial intelligence (AI) animated
by algorithms. The idea of AI is not recent. It was almost a hundred years ago that
writer Karel Čapek introduced the new word ‘robot’ in his science-fiction play ‘R.
U.R’.1 The term ‘AI’ became part of computer science’s lexicon not long after, in
1956.2 From the branch of studies related to the machine learning, algorithms
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1 The idea of artificial creatures with AI is much older. For instance, the tale of the ‘Golem’ is assigned
to the rabbi, Judah Loew ben Bezalel, who lived in Prague in the sixteenth century.
2 The founder of AI was John McCarthy, who used the term ‘Artificial Intelligence’ in his proposal in
1955 and then in the Dartmouth Conference in 1956, which was the first conference on artificial
intelligence. See Martin Childs, John McCarthy: Computer Scientist Known as the Father of AI, The
Independent (1 Nov. 2011).
developed.3 Despite the fact that AI was originally a science-fiction idea, it is not
so science-fiction anymore, given that AI is a current reality. The world a hundred
years ago did not imagine the present digital reality our generation is experiencing.
In this digital age, uncertainty of innovation is a given: due to rapid technological
developments, making predictions about the future of the digital world is almost
impossible. Despite this difficulty, two things are almost certain: the digital econ-
omy is going to be even more digital and virtual, with its essential feature,
algorithms, becoming even more autonomous and sophisticated, and their usage
will continue to increase.4 This poses challenges for the law, including competition
law.
Algorithms used in the digital world, which process big data and involve big
analytics, encompass one of the most significant areas of concern for competition
law.5 Although it is easy to point to the benefits that big data and algorithms have
introduced for businesses, consumer welfare, efficiency and the economy,6 these
digital-world tools can also be used by a particular entity to, for instance, exclude
others from the market or facilitate collusion among competitors.7
Anticompetitive collusion, primarily cartels, is among the top priorities for
many competition authorities across the world.8 The features of the digital world
represent challenges for the enforcement of anti-cartel laws, many of which are
discussed in Ezrachi and Stucke’s book ‘Virtual Competition – The Promise and
Perils of the Algorithm Driven Economy’.9 The authors claim, among other
things, that it is the tacit collusion driven and maintained by algorithms that is
3 Arthur Samuel, Some Studies in Machine Learning Using the Game of Checkers, 3(3) IBM J. Res. & Dev.
210 (1959).
4 See e.g. Kenneth Bamberger & Orly Lobel, Platform Market Power, 32(3) Berkeley Tech. L.J. 32, 36
(2017); European Commission, Final Report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry, COM(2017) 229, paras
13, 33, 54.
5 See e.g. Michal S. Gal, Algorithms as Illegal Agreements, Berkley Tech. L.J. (forthcoming); A. Ezrachi &
M. E. Stucke, Virtual Competition – The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm Driven Economy (Harvard
University Press 2016).
6 See e.g. Gal, supra n. 5.
7 See e.g. Ezrachi & Stucke, supra n. 5.
8 See for instance Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Compliance & Enforcement Policy
& Priorities 2019, https://www.accc.gov.au/about-us/australian-competition-consumer-commission/
compliance-enforcement-policy-priorities#2019-priorities; European Commission, Cartel Statistics
2015–2019, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf, US Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for International Enforcement and
Cooperation (13 Jan. 2015), at 49, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/
1049863/international_guidelines_2017.pdf (accessed 16 Dec. 2018).
9 In this book, Ezrachi and Stucke divide collusion in the digital world into four scenarios: (1)
‘Messenger’, where algorithms are used by humans as tools to execute their explicit will to collude
and maintain cartels; (2) ‘Hub and Spoke’, which is the use of a single algorithm by numerous
competitors to determine the market price; (3) ‘The Predictable Agent’, where competitors unilat-
erally use individual pricing algorithms and (4) ‘Digital Eye’, which involves self-learning algorithms.
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the most problematic and challenging for the application of competition law.10
They explain that:
[T]he use of advanced algorithms … transforms the “normal”, pre-existing market conditions. Before
algorithms, transparency was limited; conscious parallelism could not sustained. To facilitate the use of
the pricing algorithms, firms increase their transparency, which in turn makes tacit collusion like-
lier. … one may ask whether the creation of such a dynamic, though “artificial”, means should give
rise to antitrust intervention.11
This question of antitrust intervention regarding algorithmic collusion has recently
started to be explored by others in the field. For example, the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) observed that algorithms can
lead to ‘conduct in what looks very much like conscious parallelism’,12 which, as they
claim, ‘is not illegal under competition rules’.13 Indeed, they state that this ‘raises more
difficulties because the current legal standard does not allow intervention with the
traditional rules on anti-competitive agreements between competitors’.14 Thus, the
OECD, together with some other experts, has called for revisiting the antitrust/
competition-law concept of ‘agreement’,15 arguing for the expansion of the
provisions on anticompetitive collusion to conscious parallelism arising from an
oligopolistic market.16
In this article, I build on this recent discussion and challenge the argument for
changing competition law. By analysing the current competition law and eco-
nomic concepts, in particular ‘concerted practice’ and ‘oligopoly’, I explain that
there are situations with algorithms leading to parallel conduct that differ from
traditional conscious parallelism, because of the artificial character of algorithms,
already highlighted by Ezrachi and Stucke, and the fact that algorithms provide or
lead to ‘communication’ in the digital world.
In the non-digital world, conscious parallelism, also called ‘parallel conduct’,
occurs in cooperative and non-cooperative oligopolies (hereinafter ‘natural
10 Ezrachi & Stucke, supra n. 5, at 35–81.
11 Ezrachi & Stucke, supra n. 5, at 66 (emphasis added).
12 OECD, Algorithms and Collusion: Competition Policy in the Digital Age 51 (2017) http://www.oecd.org/
daf/competition/Algorithms-and-colllusion-competition-policy-in-the-digital-age.pdf (accessed 16
Dec. 2018) (emphasis added).
13 Ibid (emphasis added).
14 OECD, supra n. 12, at 51.
15 The terminology differs in different jurisdictions. See the text on ‘oligopolies’ below (fn. 17).
16 OECD, supra n. 12; see e.g. Salil K. Mehra, Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of
Algorithms, 100 Minn. L. Rev. 1323, 1340–43 (2016). Gal, on the other hand, recognizes that the
current US antitrust law and its interpretation could capture various forms of algorithmic ‘coordina-
tion’: Gal, supra n. 5. Although she shows that various situations where algorithms lead to ‘coordina-
tion’ can be captured under and prove the existence of an agreement (Gal, supra n. 5, at 26–28), she
advocates for re-thinking the existing US antitrust law in order to capture conscious parallelism created
by algorithms in a way which would focus on consumer welfare, without the need to prove the
concept of ‘an agreement’ (Gal, supra n. 5, at 43–44).
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oligopolies’)17 where, by simply observing the market, competitors independently
and unilaterally decide to, for instance, charge the same price, so-called ‘parallel
pricing’. Arguably, there is no legitimate reason to prohibit such conduct under
competition law. First, this is not a joint action but rather a group of unilateral
business decisions and, second, there is nothing inherently wrong with this con-
duct if the purpose of competition law is to protect the competitive process. A
mere unilateral decision, which is not an abuse of a dominant position and does
not restrict others from competing, is not, in its nature, anticompetitive, even if it
leads to anticompetitive results. Adapting to market conditions intelligently in
order to increase profit without restricting others from competing is part of the
competitive process.
The concept of oligopoly has an essential feature in common with the digital
world and algorithms, namely interdependency, meaning that the business decision of
one competitor will have an impact on other competitors in the relevant market.
This interdependency is not the same in the digital world as in the traditional
concept of an ‘oligopoly’. In an oligopolistic market, competitors observe each
other’s behaviour and react to the changed strategies of their competitors. For
instance, if one competitor increases her price, others will follow and also increase
their price because such a business decision is more profitable for all of them.18
Indeed, this interdependency can lead to parallel behaviour.19 In oligopolies, the
interdependency arises from the concentration and transparency of the market, the
homogeneity of the relevant product and other characteristics of the oligopolistic
market,20 while in the digital world interdependency exists due to algorithms,
which create transparency21 and dependency in digital ecosystems.22 The algorith-
mic-digital interdependency has no quantitative limit on competitors. In other
words, the market does not have to be oligopolistic for interdependency facilitated
17 I use the term ‘natural oligopoly’ for various forms of both cooperative and non-cooperative
oligopolies, which cannot be captured by EU competition law and US antitrust law under the
concepts of a ‘concerted practice’ or an ‘agreement’. One of the oldest discussions on how unilateral
practices in an oligopolistic market can lead to parallel conduct was described by Augustin Cournot in
his model of non-cooperative oligopoly: Augustin Cournot, Researches Into the Mathematical Principles of
the Theory of Wealth (1838). Other include, for instance, George J. Stigler, Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. Pol.
Econ. 44 (1964); Dennis Yao & Susan DeSanti, Game Theory and the Legal Analysis of Tacit Collusion,
38 Antitrust Bull. 113 (1993). For further information and overall discussion, see Herbert Hovenkamp,
Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice 159–173 (3d ed., Thomson West 2005).
18 See discussion in Part III, in particular fn. 48.
19 Also referred to as conscious parallelism or tacit collusion. See e.g. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 U.S. 209 (1993), at 227, where the Court states: ‘[t]acit collusion,
sometimes called oligopolistic price coordination or conscious parallelism … is not in itself unlawful’.
20 See e.g. the features of the oligopolistic market in Wood Pulp II, ECLI:EU:C:1993:120. See Alison
Jones, Woodpulp: Concerted Practice and/or Conscious Parallelism?, 6 Eur. Competition L. Rev. 273
(1993).
21 See e.g. European Commission, supra n. 4, at 11.
22 See e.g. Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 Yale L.J. 710, 754–55 (2017).
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by algorithms to occur in the digital world. Thus, the parallel conduct that can
occur, in the digital world is not restricted to oligopolies, it can happen in markets
with many competitors without geographical limitations. I call this phenomenon a
‘digital polyopoly’, which is a situation in the relevant market in the digital world
that leads to parallel conduct.
How competition law should perceive a digital polyopoly is an essential
question of this article. Despite recent scholarly works and policy discussions on
algorithmic collusion,23 what algorithms are for the purposes of anti-cartel law,
and whether and how they fit within the existing concepts of competition law,
have remained significant subjects for discussion. It is unlikely that various
jurisdictions will introduce completely new competition law, notwithstanding
that this is not, as I explain in this article, absolutely necessary. What is essential
at this stage, given the relevant new features of the digital economy and the
prediction of increased occurrences of parallel conduct created and/or facili-
tated by algorithms in the future, is to rethink the existing concepts and
interpret the law effectively to ensure a readiness to enforce the law with
regard to digital polyopolies. Some minor amendments tailored for the digital
world can further maximize the effectiveness of competition law to capture
digital polyopolies.
I commence with characterizing and discussing a number of the features of
the digital economy. Within this, I explain, amongst other things, that, in the
digital world, competition occurs in ecosystems, which involve diagonal and
vertical relationships and interactions, and thus horizontal collusion includes
non-horizontal elements and relationships. I then move to answering the essen-
tial question of this article by applying an analogy between explaining the
concepts of a ‘natural oligopoly’,24 and ‘concerted practice’,25 which occurs in
a concentrated/oligopolistic market, on one hand, and a digital polyopoly on the
other hand. I first explain these concepts and the way EU competition law
applies to them, while making a few references to US antitrust law, and then
apply these concepts to digital polyopolies and the various ways algorithms lead
to parallel conduct. I then determine whether competition law can apply to
digital polyopolies and under what conditions. In the final part, I make remarks
on the question of liability.
23 For instance, Gal, supra n. 5; OECD, supra n. 12, at 51; Ezrachi & Stucke, supra n. 5; Mehra, supra n.
16.
24 In the case of a natural oligopoly, the oligopolistic market leads to conscious parallelism without
reaching an agreement and/or concerted practice. See Part III.
25 See the discussion on concerted practice in Part III.
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2 COMPETITION AND ALGORITHMS IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY
The digital economy has changed how firms compete and also how they collude.
In order to determine how firms collude in the digital world, it is essential to
commence with explaining how the digital world has changed the competitive
process and outlining the crucial features of the digital economy, most importantly,
algorithms.
Competition in the digital economy can make it easy to directly address
consumers,26 while at the same time making the whole process more complex.
On the one hand, the digital world offers a direct way of competing by, for
instance, giving producers the ability to place their products on their own website.
In doing so, they vertically integrate as they not only produce their products but
also sell them directly to the consumers. Thus, the digital world facilitates vertical
integration.27 On the other hand, competing in the digital world is more complex
than in the pre-digital-economy because competing in the digital space involves
interacting in digital ecosystems. A digital ecosystem creates interdependency
between users, who can be competitors, customers, suppliers, related industry
partners and consumers. This interdependency can facilitate collusion.
Typically, a platform is part of an ecosystem or it creates it.28 By creating
digital ecosystems, various platforms, such as search engines and comparative and
review platforms, do not occur on the traditional vertical and horizontal chains,
instead their relationship with the suppliers of various goods and services is
diagonal. Others, such as Amazon, can be placed on the traditional vertical and
horizontal chains. However, the relationship between such a platform and a
particular entity is more complex than in the non-digital world due to its multi-
sided-market characteristics. For instance, Amazon, in addition to acting as an
agent-buyer on the vertical chain, is a marketing platform, delivery and logistics
network, payment service, credit lender, auction house, major book publisher,
TV/film producer, fashion designer, hardware manufacturer, provider of cloud
server space and computing power.29 Many of its rivals are also its customers.30
Once an entity enters the digital world, it automatically becomes a part of the
digital ecosystem, including various platforms, or the entity can also choose to use
specific platforms. Platforms have a significant impact on the entity’s business and
26 See e.g. European Commission, supra n. 4, para. 14.
27 Ibid., para. 15.
28 Some ecosystems are more open than others. Generally, the Open Web is more open than Facebook,
which is controlled and recorded by its Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). For the arguments
for perceiving the Open Web as a platform, see Jean-Christophe Plantin, Carl Lagozel, Paul Edwards &
Christian Sandvig, Infrastructure Studies Meet Platform Studies in the Age of Google and Facebook, 20(1)
New Media & Soc’y 293 (2018).
29 Khan, supra n. 22, at 713.
30 Ibid., at 754–55.
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its success. They have different forms and purposes assisting producers and suppliers
with succeeding and competing for consumers in a certain way. They can assist
with selling products and making businesses more visible, reachable and attractive
for consumers and suppliers, for example, a search platform such as Google can
make a particular producer more or less visible to consumers.31 The placing of the
producer on the list of search results has a direct effect on its profit and success with
regards to competition.
The diagonal player in the market – a platform – can also utilize or assist with
the facilitation and monitoring of potential collusion via the various algorithms it
uses. This has a number of implications for competition law and competition itself,
including the fact that it is not only horizontal competitors but also diagonal
players who can significantly contribute to horizontal collusion in the digital
world.
2.1 ALGORITHMS
Specific algorithms, which can be part of a platform, can lead to anticompetitive
collusion in the digital world. Algorithms are sets of mathematical steps designed to
solve specific problems or perform specific tasks.32 They are the essential building
blocks of the digital world, allowing for all of its fundamental functions, all of
which are related to information. In particular, they allow us to share, search for,
store and analyse information. These ‘information’ functions created by algorithms
make the market more transparent than it was in the pre-digital age. In the digital
economy, it is significantly easier to find and collect information than it was for a
‘brick and mortar’ shop before the internet and digitalization,33 at speeds and
amounts previously unthinkable. This change leads to obvious positives for com-
petition and the economy but can also facilitate negative anticompetitive beha-
viour such as anticompetitive collusion. Indeed, algorithm parameters are coded to
be set in accordance with the specific task it is designed to perform, which can
potentially have an anticompetitive objective. In the literature, it is usually price
algorithmic collusion that is discussed.34 Such algorithms analyse information via
31 Some companies have set up entire businesses to improve the position of its customers in Google’s
search results. See e.g. Plantin, Lagozel, Edwards & Sandvig, supra n. 28, at 305.
32 There are various definitions for algorithms. For instance, the OECD defines an algorithm as ‘an
instance of logic that generates an output from a given input, whether it is a method to solve a
mathematical problem, a food recipe or a music sheet’: OECD, supra n. 12, at 9.
33 See e.g. European Commission, supra n. 4, para. 56.
34 See e.g. Ibid., para. 33; Ezrachi & Stucke, supra n. 4, at 35–81; Paolo Palmigiano & David Foster,
Pricing Algorithms and Competition Law, paper presented at the Advanced EU Competition Law
Conference, Brussels, 21 Nov. 2017.
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predictive analytics.35 However, algorithms can facilitate other forms of cartels,
such as output and customer allocations.36
Because algorithms are usually mathematically precise, involving mathematical
guessing games, welfare economics and economic game theories can be easily
incorporated into them. The task the algorithm is set to do can be simple or
complex. More complex algorithms37 can provide a self-learning process, machine
learning, where AI can learn through its own experiences,38 including learning
‘through trial and error’, or so-called ‘deep-learning’.39 Deep-learning algorithms
are some of the most sophisticated, and are coded to imitate the structure of the
biological neurons needed for human decision-making. Such algorithms possess
some independency from pre-set parameters as they can develop their own
strategies based on observing existing patterns – hence, self-learning.40
Machine-learning algorithms have become more and more common, mean-
ing that humans have been losing control over various processes in the digital
world. This development has to be considered when determining whether and to
what extent current competition law is fit for the purpose of addressing algorithmic
collusion in the digital world.
I distinguish three general situations where algorithms can generate collusion41:
(1) Direct: the algorithms are designed to create collusion.
(2) Indirect: the algorithms are not designed for anticompetitive purposes
but it is reasonable to assume they could lead to collusion.
(3) Indirect/no knowledge: the algorithms are not designed for anticom-
petitive purposes but they lead to collusion accidently and/or through
algorithmic AI, without the existence of a reasonable prediction that
they could have done so.
35 See e.g. Bamberger & Lobel, supra n. 4, at 25; European Commission, supra n. 4, paras 3, 13.
36 For instance, the allocation of customers or territorial restrictions as forms of collusion are easily done
in the digital world. See Plantin, Lagozel, Edwards & Sandvig, supra n. 28, at 305; Min Jiang, Search
Concentration, Bias and Parochialism: A Comparative Study of Google, Baidu, and Jike’s search results from
China, 64 J. Comm. 1088 (2014).
37 In the rest of the article, the term ‘algorithm(s)’ is used very broadly and can also mean a group of
algorithms, including software such as automatic software programs. It is usually not one but a group
of algorithms which are used for complex tasks in the digital world. Given that recent literature on
algorithmic collusion refers to algorithms and not software programs (for instance, Gal, supra n. 5;
Ezrachi & Stucke, supra n. 5), I maintain consistency with the emerging scholarly works by doing the
same.
38 One of the first theoretical works in the field of machine learning which introduced this concept is
Samuel, supra n. 3, at 535.
39 OECD, supra n. 12, at 9.
40 Their mechanisms and relevance to anticompetitive collusion is well explained in Francisco Beneke &
Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt, Artificial Intelligence and Collusion, 50(1) IIC-Int’l Rev. Intell. Prop. &
Competition L. 109, 111–12 (2019); OECD, supra n. 12, at 11.
41 How algorithms operate with regards to facilitating parallel conduct is well described by Gal: Gal, supra
n. 5, at 9–23.
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Thus, either the algorithms form a direct tool with the purpose of creating
and/or maintaining a cartel42 or concerted practice, or they create parallel
conduct, such as parallel pricing, because the environment created by the
algorithms leads to parallel conduct, as is the case in situations 2 and 3. Such
an environment that leads to parallel conduct forms a ‘digital polyopoly’.
Digital polyopolies also involve situations based on direct collusion without
the existence of an explicit, non-algorithmic agreement on cartel (the direct
way – situation 1). These include instances where algorithms are deliberately
designed to exchange information on business strategies such as future prices
among competitors. In this way, the algorithms eliminate uncertainties about
strategies and create conditions in the market which differ to the normal market
conditions leading to parallel, anticompetitive conduct. Such conditions and the
objective of these algorithms are not to increase competition but, on the
contrary, to distort it.
We will see in the next part of the article that, like an oligopolistic market
which can lead to parallel conduct in the form of a natural oligopoly or concerted
practice, a digital polyopoly can either have some similarities with a natural
oligopoly or constitute concerted practice depending on the circumstances and
attributes of the specific situation.
3 OLIGOPOLIES, CONCERTED PRACTICES AND DIGITAL
POLYOPOLIES
Digital polyopolies share some common features with oligopolies, namely
interdependence and transparency. Unlike the concept of a digital polyopoly,
the term ‘oligopoly’, as well as its related features and theories, are well
established in competition law, its policy and economics. In this part of the
article, I will show that, due to common features shared by digital polyopolies
and oligopolies, the way competition law deals with oligopolies can be crucial
for determining how competition law should perceive digital polyopolies. I
commence with explaining the concepts of ‘oligopoly’ and ‘concerted practice’
and proceed to explain and apply these concepts to digital polyopolies.
42 There are some cases which deal with explicit human cartels, where part of the anticompetitive
agreement is to facilitate the cartel via algorithms. Such cases do not generally represent a difficulty to
the traditional way of applying competition/antitrust law. See e.g. United States v. David Topkins, case
settled via plea agreement (30 Apr. 2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case/us-v-david-topkins
(accessed 16 Dec. 2018).
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3.1 OLIGOPOLY AND CONCERTED PRACTICE
In the oligopolistic market, a business decision made by each competitor, such as a
decision on future price, has an imminent impact on other competitors. This is due
to characteristics of an oligopolistic market, including:
− high market concentration
− homogenous products
− barriers to entry
− inelastic demand; and
− transparency.43
These characteristic create interdependency among competitors, which can lead to
parallel behaviour44 in the form of, for instance, parallel pricing. Parallel pricing
means that the prices charged by competing entities are the same in the relevant
market, and these are above the competitive level. This has an anticompetitive
effect similar to a direct agreement to fix prices. It occurs either due to the mere
nature of the relevant market (hereinafter ‘natural oligopoly’) or because an
oligopolistic market facilitates anticompetitive cooperation among competitors in
the market, which goes beyond unilateral conduct. Various jurisdictions use
different legal terminologies to capture the second scenario. For instance, EU
and Australian competition laws refer to ‘concerted practice’, while US courts
use the broad term of ‘an agreement’.45 References have also been made to other
terms such as ‘facilitating practices’46 or ‘coordination’.47 Because the following
part focuses on the EU approach, I use the term ‘concerted practice’.
A natural oligopoly and, to a certain extent, concerted practice in a concen-
trated market lead to the interdependence between firms that occurs due to the
transparency and concentration of the market and the homogenous nature of the
product or service in question. In a natural oligopoly, firms recognize their
interdependence. They decide unilaterally – independently – that they will, for
instance, charge the same prices. This phenomenon of parallel conduct, in this case
43 See e.g. Price Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand (M.1016) [1998] OJ C376, paras 95 and 96.
44 Also referred to as conscious parallelism or tacit collusion. See e.g. Brooke v. Brown & Williamson, supra
n. 19, at 227, where the Court states: ‘[t]acit collusion, sometimes called oligopolistic price coordina-
tion or conscious parallelism … is not in itself unlawful’.
45 The US legislation, the Sherman Act 1892, refers to terms ‘combination’ and ‘conspiracy’ which could
be used to cover, to a certain extent, what the term ‘concerted practice’ covers in the EU. The US
courts commonly use the terms ‘an agreement’ or ‘collusion’. See e.g. United States v. Trans-Missouri
Fright Assn., 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898),
affirmed, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
46 Hovenkamp, supra n. 17, at 169.
47 Gal, supra n. 5.
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parallel pricing, is explained by economic game theories,48 which show how, in an
oligopolistic market, firms follow their collective interests rather than their indivi-
dual interests.
To illustrate, in a natural oligopoly, if one of the competitors increases its price,
both its customers and competitors will have that information due to the transpar-
ency and concentration of the market. As suggested by game theories, its competi-
tors may make the same decision and increase their price, as in doing so they will
increase their profit because all competitors will eventually follow and increase their
prices as well, while maintaining their output due to the homogeneity of the relevant
product.49 Despite the fact that this leads to parallel pricing, there is nothing illegal in
this scenario, as the competitors are making individual strategic price decisions based
on observing the market and their competitors and deciding what is best for them
within that oligopolistic market structure. They do not collude and they do not go
beyond what the nature of the market allows them to do. Indeed, unilateral business
decisions based on merely observing the oligopolistic market but leading to parallel
conduct are legal because, as the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
puts it, competition law ‘does not deprive economic operators of the right to adapt
themselves intelligently to the existing and anticipated conduct of their competitors’.50
A number of cases provide good examples of when the nature of an oligo-
polistic market leads to parallel behaviour, one of them being Wood Pulp II.51 This
case involved a homogenous product, bleached sulphate pulp, used in the manu-
facture of article. The market consisted of a group of oligopolies and oligopsonies52
with high barriers to entry due to, for instance, the large capital investment
required for opening a new pulp mill. The market was transparent because the
nature of the market required an advanced announcement of prices made to
customers and potential customers.53 These natural market conditions led to
48 See in particular the work of Antoine A Cournot, Joseph LF Bertrand & John F Nash. A non-cooperative
Nash-Cournot equilibrium will result in higher prices and lower output than would be the case in a fully
competitive game, but lower prices and higher output arise in a fully cooperative game. See generally F.
M. Scherer & David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (3d ed., Houghton Mifflin
Company 1990), Ch. 6; Avanish Dixit, Susan Skeath & David H. Reiley Jr, Games of Strategy (3d ed., W.
W. Norton & Co 2010); Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, Antitrust Economics (OUP 2009), Ch. 11.
See also Robert C. Marshall & Leslie M. Marx, The Economics of Collusion: Cartels and Bidding Rings (MIT
Press 2012).
49 By maintaining the same output while increasing prices, they do not lose their customers. This is only
possible if all them recognize that this strategy maximizes their profit and therefore is a better strategy
than not increasing their price.
50 Cases C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-117/85, C-125/85 – C-129/85 A. Ahlström
Osakeyhtiö and others v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1993:120, at ¶ 71 (‘Wood Pulp II’); see also e.g. US
case: Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 475 U.S. 574 (1986), at 588; Brooke v.
Brown & Williamson, supra n. 19, at 227.
51 Wood Pulp II, ECLI:EU:C:1993:120. See Jones, supra n. 20.
52 Oligopsony refers to the concentration of the downstream/buyer market.
53 Wood Pulp II, ECLI:EU:C:1993:120, at 430–37; 574–76, 578–79.
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parallel pricing, with prices rising at a time of over-capacity. Thus, the parallel
price announcements, and the parallelism of the prices themselves, did not con-
stitute illegal anticompetitive collusion in the form of concerted practice but were
explained by the economic factors of a natural oligopoly.54
In the case of a concerted practice in a concentrated market, collusion is
facilitated where firms seek to replace truly independent decision-making with
forms of coordination. This can happen, for instance, in the situation where one of
the competitors decides to decrease its price in the hope of gaining more customers
and thus selling more products. This situation could lead to intensive price
competition. At some point, the market players might want to correct this by
communicating amongst each other and coordinating their price strategies. This
could happen in the form of direct price fixing agreements – cartels – or in a less
direct form, where competitors communicate amongst themselves by exchanging
information on price and/or other business conduct that is not available in the
market itself. This would constitute a concerted practice. This situation requires
some form of direct or indirect communication among competitors that goes
beyond the nature of the market and which increases the transparency of the
market. Parallel pricing arising from the exchange of information among compe-
titors rather than just the nature of the market can constitute a concerted practice.
Indeed, the common piece of evidence pivotal for proving a concerted
practice, besides the parallel conduct itself, is communication.55 The evidence of
communication that goes beyond the nature of the market is usually direct but it
can also be detected from the structure of and the conditions in the market.56 Mere
54 Ibid., at 578–83.
55 See for instance examples in, cases 48, 49, and 51–57/69 Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v. Commission
of the European Communities ECLI:EU:C:1972:70 (Dyestuffs), paras 66–123; Cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to
56, 111, 113 and 114/73 European Sugar Cartel, re; Coöperatieve Vereniging ‘Suiker Unie’ UA v.
Commission [1975] ECR 1663, paras 148–55. The EU competition law is applied in a way, which
uses the term ‘communication’ in abroad way. See e.g. Cases T-25–26/95 etc. Cimenteries CBR SA
and Others v. E.C. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2000:77, para. 87. Communication(s) means an exchange
of information either directly or by using some medium. It also means the transmission of information
via e.g. telephone, radio or computers. (See Macquarie Dictionary (online ed., at 30 Apr. 2019)
‘Communication’; Merriam Webster (Richard Boucher ed., online ed., at 30 Apr. 2019)
‘Communication’.) The Merriam-Webster Dictionary refers to communication as ‘a process by
which information is exchanged between individuals through common system of symbols, signs or
behaviour’. There has also been other circumstantial evidence. The US refers to this kind of evidence
as ‘plus factors’ and, besides communication, it has included, for instance, the creation of an
unreasonable product standards [National Macaroni Mfrs. Association v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421 (7th
Circ.1965)] or identical sealed bids against all probability when tenders have been invited [FTC v.
Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948)].
56 Typically, a situation where parallel conduct exists but the conduct cannot be explained by the nature
of the oligopoly because the market is missing some characteristics of an oligopolistic market, such as
transparency. Such a market structure would indicate the existence of concerted practice. See e.g.
Cimenteries, ECLI:EU:T:2000:77, para. 87. This was the case in the US case of American Tobacco Co. v.
U.S., 328 U.S. 781 (1946). See fn. 57.
320 WORLD COMPETITION
parallel pricing could be crucial evidence for proving an infringement of competi-
tion law if the economic factors do not support the claim that the parallel pricing
exists due to a natural oligopoly.57
Communication between competitors can, therefore, be direct or indirect.58 It
can either be two-sided, such as the exchange of relevant information between
competitors, or it can be unilateral, such as a unilateral disclosure of information,
which can result in anticompetitive collusion if that information is accepted by a
competitor who then acts upon it. For instance, in US v. Foley,59 it was held that
an announcement of an intended action can be an invitation to competitors to
agree to a similar action, and that if competitors did in fact undertake such action
the courts could infer the existence of an agreement.60
In the EU, the object or effect of this communication must be ‘to create
conditions of competition which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the
market in question, regard being had to the nature of the products or services
offered, the size and number of the undertakings and the volume of the said
market’.61 Other features of this anticompetitive communication are the removal
of uncertainties and a lack of independent acting. In other words, communication,
which leads to conditions of the market which differ to the normal conditions of
the market, also removes uncertainties and results from a lack of independent
acting. For instance, in Dyestuffs, the CJEU held that advanced announcements
utilized by the competitors in the market led to prohibited parallel conduct in the
form of concerted practice. It stated that ‘[b]y means of these advance announce-
ments the various undertakings eliminated all uncertainty between them as to their
future conduct and, in doing so, also eliminated a large part of the risk usually inherent
in any independent change of conduct on one or several markets’.62 Communication
can constitute an anticompetitive object under Article 101(1): if it ‘directly or
indirectly fix[es] purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions’63 by
57 Economic evidence is important. Situations where parallel actions do not make economic sense in the
absence of a cooperative strategy could constitute a prohibited anticompetitive agreement or concerted
practice. This was the case in the US case of American Tobacco.
Regarding EU law, see e.g. Wood Pulp II, ECLI:EU:C:1993:120, para. 71; in Dyestuffs, ECLI:EU:
C:1972:70 the CJEU stated at para. 66 that ‘[a]lthough parallel behaviour may not by itself be
identified with a concerted practice, it may however amount to strong evidence of such a practice
if it leads to conditions of competition which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the
market’.
58 See e.g. Cimenteries ECLI:EU:T:2000:77, para. 87.
59 598 F.2d 1323 (4th Circ. 1979).
60 Also see e.g. EU: Cimenteries, ECLI:EU:T:2000:77; US: National Macaroni, 345 F.2d 421; In re
Coordinated Pre-trial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 906 F.2d 432 (9th Circ. 1990).
61 Cimenteries, ECLI:EU:T:2000:77, para. 87 (emphasis added). Also see e.g. Case C-8/08, T-Mobile
Netherlands BV v. Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, ECLI:EU:C:2009:343, para.
33; 114/73 Suiker Unie, ECR 1663, para. 4.
62 Dyestuffs, at 101, emphasis added, also see at 112, 119.
63 T-Mobile Netherlands, ECLI:EU:C:2009:343, at 37.
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‘removing uncertainties concerning the intended conduct of the participating under-
takings, in particular as regards the timing, extent and details of the modifications
to be adopted by the undertaking concerned’64
With regard to the feature of concerted practice of a lack of independent
acting, the CJEU held that Article 101 TFEU concerning ‘coordination’ and
‘cooperation’ requires that:
each economic operator must determine independently the policy which he intends to
adopt on the common market
Although it is correct to say that this requirement of independence does not deprive
economic operators of the right to adapt themselves intelligently to the existing and
anticipated conduct of their competitors, it does however strictly preclude any direct or indirect
contact between such operators, the object or effect whereof is either to influence the conduct
on the market of an actual or potential competitor or to disclose to such a competitor the
course of conduct which they themselves have decided to adopt or contemplate adopting
on the market.65
Therefore, the exchange of information that goes beyond the nature of the market
and which leads to a reduction in uncertainty and a lack of independent acting
would constitute concerted practice. Whereas parallel conduct that arises from a
natural oligopoly lacks these elements.
3.2 THE CONCEPT OF DIGITAL POLYOPOLY
Digital algorithms can create conditions which bring competitors into anticompe-
titive cooperation. Similar to an oligopolistic market, which can lead to concerted
practice or natural oligopolies, the digital world can align competitors in parallel
conduct in both forms. An oligopolistic market requires a small number of
competitors in order to lead to the parallel conduct; however, the parallel conduct
that originates in the digital world and is driven by algorithms, named ‘digital
polyopoly’ in this article, is not limited by the number of competitors. Despite this
principal difference and other features of the digital world that significantly change
the manner and conditions under which parallel conduct can be achieved, digital
polyopolies share some essential features with oligopolies, namely interdependence
and transparency.
Interdependence is the essential connector among competitors in oligopolies
and also in digital polyopolies (despite coming in different forms). We have seen
that the interdependence of the oligopolistic market can lead to parallel conduct
either in the form of a natural oligopoly or concerted practice. As in the
64 Ibid., para. 3 (emphasis added); also see e.g. Dyestuffs, ECLI:EU:C:1972:70, para. 3.
65 Suiker Unie, ECR 1663, paras 4, 173; also see e.g. Dyestuffs, ECLI:EU:C:1972:70, para. 10; C-49/92 P,
Commission v. Anic Partecipazioni, EU:C:1999:356, para.116.
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oligopolistic markets, the digital world leads to interdependency, which can then
lead to parallel conduct. However, the conditions leading to this interdependency
are not the same. While in the oligopolistic market, it is the small number of
competitors and the transparency of the market that align competitors, in the
digital world, interdependency is created by and within digital ecosystems and
their algorithms, as we saw in Part II. These ecosystems with their algorithms then
also lead to transparency in the digital world.
The global connectivity and interoperability of the digital world makes informa-
tion highly transparent66 at all levels (e.g. among competitors and buyers and sellers),67
creating an environment that is even more transparent than non-digital oligopolies.
The digital world not only makes information transparent and available but, at the
same time, it allows for the analysis of huge amounts of data, creating collaborative and
other links at different levels of a digital ecosystem. This is possible due to algorithms.
Data collection and data analytics built in to algorithms create another layer of
interdependency and transparency in the digital world by storing, collecting, using
and processing the available information. The processing performed by algorithms
includes optimizing models, which can take into consideration the impact that
competitors’ future prices will have on the user of the particular algorithms.68 These
processes occur at enormous speeds that were unimaginable before the digital age, and
this speed forms another essential factor of the digital world, given that algorithms can
allow for competitors to learn of each other’s prices, sales and other variables within
seconds.69 The more transparent the market is, the quicker the algorithms react to
adjust prices accordingly. They can even adjust prices before a price change occurs,
simply through precise predictions.70 The rapid speed can also eliminate the need for
high barriers to entry typical of oligopolies because algorithms can detect any market
change even before it occurs and adjust to it immediately. However, in order to
establish a stable polyopoly, high barriers to entry are needed.71
The significant transparency that exists in the digital world includes price
transparency,72 and it is this price transparency and price parallel behaviour that
66 This significant shift towards transparency in the digital world can be limited by the usage of
algorithms, especially in situations where specific platforms are involved. In particular, the use of
APIs by platforms is decreasing transparency and access to data by creating ‘walled gardens’. This is
because the API locks both users and app developers into a landscape defined and controlled by the
platform, such as Facebook, whereby, the increasing use of APIs by platforms has been removing
information from the Open Web. See Plantin, Lagozel, Edwards & Sandvig, supra n. 28, at 302–04.
67 See e.g. European Commission, supra n. 4, para. 11.
68 Joseph Harrington, Developing Competition Law for Collusion by Autonomous Artificial Agents, Department
of Business Economics & Public Policy, University of Pennsylvania, at 59 (2018).
69 Ibid., at 55.
70 See e.g. Ezrachi & Stucke, supra n. 5, at 72–73.
71 See also Gal, supra n. 5, at 12–19.
72 See e.g. European Commission, supra n. 4, para. 11.
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tends to be discussed most in connection with the digital world. For instance,
when conducting an inquiry into e-commerce in 2015–2016, the European
Commission found that two thirds of investigated companies used software pro-
grams that automatically adjusted prices based on the prices charged by
competitors.73 Such adjustments are not difficult in the digital world because the
digital environment makes monitoring, including price monitoring, much easier,
allowing for potential deviations to be more easily detected and corrected faster.74
Both the transparency and rapid speed also mean that coordination problems, such
as cheating, are less of a problem in the digital world because rightly constructed
algorithms can detect any deviation immediately.75
Price transparency and related price monitoring are also common in oligopo-
listic markets. However, algorithms can monitor and/or involve countless distri-
butors and competitors at speeds impossible in the non-digital world. Such
activities that would take several hours, even days, to achieve in the non-digital
world, and could be only achieved in an oligopolistic market, now take seconds to
do. Indeed, unlike in oligopolistic markets, in the digital world, horizontal markets
do not have to be oligopolistic (in other words, highly concentrated) in order to
lead to parallel behaviour. In the digital world, it does not matter how many
competitors there are: everyone can be connected, anywhere in the world. There
are no numerical or geographical limits76 for information to be transparent, avail-
able, exchanged and evaluated. This means that potential parallel behaviour does
not only occur within the limits of the oligopoly, as is the case in the non-digital
markets, instead, in the digital world, there can be parallel behaviours in polyopolies,
where there are no numerical limits on competitors and other participants.
Like in oligopolies, homogenous products and inelastic demand form pre-
conditions for the existence of parallel behaviour in polyopolies. However, even in
situations where the products are not homogenous in the relevant market, algo-
rithms can be coded in such a way as to lead to sectoral parallel pricing, thus
creating an illusion of competition. If the relevant product is not homogenous, various
algorithms can arrange various products based on differences. Products which are
similar, such as those that have the same functions and quality, will end up with the
same price, which would be higher than in a non-digital, competitive environ-
ment. This price will then differ from the price of products from another group. In
this situation, there will be different prices across the market depending on the
73 European Commission, supra n. 4, at 13.
74 See e.g. European Commission, supra n. 4, paras 11, 13; Palmigiano & Foster, supra n. 34.
75 The speed with which any cheating can be detected is highly important for the existence and the
stability of anticompetitive coordination. The slower the participants are able to detect any deviation,
the more likely the cheating is. See e.g. Stigler, supra n. 17.
76 Unless these limits are created by specific algorithms.
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group of products, but these prices will be formed by sectional parallelism due to
specific algorithms and, therefore, create the illusion of competition.
4 ALGORITHMS AND APPLICATION OF COMPETITION LAW TO
DIGITAL POLYOPOLIES
Now that we have seen how the digital world on one hand and oligopolies on the
other can lead to parallel behaviour, it is important for the application of competi-
tion law to digital polyopolies to combine both aspects, and determine whether the
digital polyopoly can be captured by the legal concept of concerted practice. Given
that in the digital world, parallel conduct is facilitated, established and/or main-
tained via algorithms, the essential question for the application of competition law
to a digital polyopoly is how competition policy and law should perceive algo-
rithms. In order to determine that, the following questions, which arise from the
concept of ‘concerted practice’, must be answered:
− Do algorithms constitute a form of communication? In other words, do
they provide an exchange of information?
− If they do constitute a form of communication, do these particular
algorithms
− ‘create conditions of competition which do not correspond to the
normal conditions of the market’?77
− remove the uncertainties of business decisions, which facilitate parallel
conduct? and
− lead to a lack of independent acting?
A substantively simplified way of looking at algorithms would be to perceive them
as ‘natural’ elements of the digital economy and thus normal conditions of the
relevant market. This view would preclude, or at least hinder, current competition
law from finding anticompetitive behaviour in the form of collusion in situations
where parallel behaviour occurs in the digital world due to algorithms. The reason
for this is that parallel behaviour that corresponds to the normal conditions of the
market is, under the concept of a natural oligopoly, legal.
However, the nature of algorithms is more complex and certainly differs from
the conditions of the pre-digital era. In particular, algorithms change the concept
of communication because, in the digital world, communication happens via
algorithms or algorithms allow for non-human communication among various
entities, such as interoperability.
77 Cimenteries, ECLI:EU:T:2000:77, para. 87.
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As discussed in Part II, the digital world is about information, and algorithms
allow for that information to be collected, transmitted, shared and analysed. In
particular, the sharing of information can be perceived as communication78 and,
thus, the function of some algorithms can also be perceived as forms of
communication.79 They do not only provide communication among various
entities in the digital world, including competitors, they can also communicate
directly amongst themselves via reading parameters. In particular, they can be
constructed in such a way as to allow them to read other algorithms80 and to
make a particular business decision after they take into consideration the para-
meters of these other algorithms.81 This allows firms and/or their algorithms to
know each other’s strategic business decisions regarding prices or other future
conduct that would otherwise not be available in the market and is not required by
the nature of the market. Such knowledge would not have been possible without
these algorithms. As Gal puts it, ‘[w]hen an algorithm is transparent to others,
another algorithm can “read its mind” and accurately predict all its future actions
when given any specific sets of inputs, including changes in market conditions and
reactions to other player’s actions’. This is not true with regard to human
interaction.82 Indeed, algorithmic communication encompasses a new way of
communicating.
We know from the previous discussion on concerted practice that communica-
tion can even include a one-sided expression of information or an announcement of
future conduct with the other party acting upon it, as the focus of proving concerted
practice is broadly on ‘any direct or indirect contact between [entities]’.83 Certainly,
making parameters regarding future business conduct transparent where the market
does not require the announcement of future conduct and other entities’ algorithms
78 See fn. 54, where the definitions of communication includes exchanges of information ‘through
common system of symbols, signs or behaviour’ directly or ‘by using some medium’. It also includes
means of communication. Under EU competition law, concerted practice can arise from either ‘direct
or indirect contact’ among competitors (if at the horizontal level). See Cimenteries, ECLI:EU:
T:2000:77, para. 87.
79 Despite the fact that algorithms are linked to information and provide those functions, including
functions typified for communication, transmitting and sharing information, there exists a conflicting
perception as to whether algorithms can be perceived as a form of communication. While some claim
that they are: Gal, supra n. 5, at 22–37, others disagree: Ashwin Ittoo & Nicholas Petit, Algorithmic
Pricing Agents and Tacit Collusion: A Technological Perspective 2–3 (2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3046405 (accessed 16 Dec. 2018).
80 They were originally set as to be read by other algorithms. See Gal, supra n. 5, at 15, referring to Von
Neumann, First Draft of a Report on the EDVAC, reproduced in Origins of Digital Computers: Selected
Papers 383 (Brian Randel led. 1982). More recent development has seen the rise of hidden parameters.
See e.g. Plantin, Lagozel, Edwards & Sandvig, supra n. 28.
81 Michal S. Gal provides a persuasive argument for perceiving specific algorithms as forms of commu-
nication and explains well the technical side of it in: Gal, supra n. 5, at 15–17, 22, 37.
82 Ibid., at 15. Michal S. Gal explains this further and provides examples. She also refers to Mosche
Tenenholtz, Program Equilibrium, 49 Games & Econ. Behaviour 363, 364 (2004).
83 Cimenteries, ECLI:EU:T:2000:77, para. 87.
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read them and act upon them by forming parallel conduct represents exactly that.
For instance, if algorithms, which calculate and set future prices, have their para-
meters open for others to read and others set their prices in collusion with these
parameters then this could constitute concerted practice. Whereas prohibited com-
munication among competitors does not exist where the algorithms only observe the
announcements on prices required by the nature of the market and upon those bases
make a decision about their client’s own price. Like in Woodpulp II, this could
include future prices if the nature of the market requires that future prices must be
known in advance, for instance due to long-term contracts with customers.
Indeed, in situations where the particular algorithms amount to communica-
tion, the next step is to determine what information the algorithms contain and
exchange in order to decide whether the concept of concerted practice applies to
that particular digital polyopoly. For concerted practice to apply, the information
must be of a business nature, such as information about future prices; it must
remove uncertainties associated with crucial future business conduct and also lead
to a lack of independent acting in that regard. Algorithms can certainly remove
uncertainties (including uncertainties related to business strategies such as future
price) by reading each other’s parameters, which set, for instance, future prices.
Another way of removing uncertainties is by sharing the same algorithms among
competitors via a platform or joint software, which determines future business
strategic conduct because the parameters for determining such future conduct are
the same, thus making the information about this future conduct transparent across
the users of the same algorithms.84 Digital polyopolies established by such algo-
rithms would, understandably, also eliminate risks associated with independent,
unilateral acting.85 Algorithms which share information on future conduct such as
prices and then unify them are not in line with independent acting as it is under-
stood for the purposes of non-digital world. The usage of such algorithms does not
amount to independent, human decision-making on business conduct on behalf of
specific economic entities by observing competitors’ conduct.
If a lack of independent acting and the removal of uncertainties lead to parallel
conduct on this strategic business conduct, in other words, a digital polyopoly, the
final step is to determine whether the information exchanged is required by the
nature of the market or not. If not, the digital polyopoly is captured by the concept
of concerted practice. If yes, the digital polyopoly would have similar features to a
84 Also see Beneke & Mackenrodt, supra n. 40, at 126–27. Ezrachi and Stucke discuss a number of
examples where the same algorithms were used to facilitate collusion. However, these examples
involve humans agreeing to collude (Ezrachi & Stucke, supra n. 5, at 39–41.). For instance, this
occurred in the airline industry. This was also the case in Case C-74/14, ‘Eturas’ UAB v. Lietuvos
Rspublikos konkurencijos taryba EU:C:2016:42.
85 See e.g. 114/73 Suiker Unie, ECR 1663, para. 4; Cimenteries, ECLI:EU:T:2000:77, para. 87 (emphasis
added), T-Mobile Netherlands BV, ECLI:EU:C:2009:343, para. 33.
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oligopoly, which does not amount to the concept of concerted practice. From the
text on oligopolies and concerted practice, we can see that the exchange of
information between competitors, such as the exchange of information about
future strategic plans, future prices or future quantity, is not usually a ‘normal
condition’ of the market. However, the exchange of information, such as provid-
ing future prices to customers where the nature of the market requires it, is a
normal condition of the market.86 By applying these concepts to digital polyopo-
lies, we can come to the same conclusion, meaning that the exchange of informa-
tion in the digital space, in other words the exchange of data, can be either of those
depending on the specific situation.
In general, some algorithms can be compared to natural oligopolies while
others lead to mutual collusion. One side of the scale involves algorithms which
lead to parallel behaviour via mutual communication among competitors. This can
happen via numerous algorithms used by individual competitors designed to
exchange information amongst themselves. For instance, competitors’ algorithms
can communicate and exchange information about price. Even unilateral commu-
nication linked to a competitor’s algorithms, where others act upon it and in that
way accept the offer for collusion, can amount to bilateral/multilateral conduct
captured by the concept of concerted practice and is certainly not a result of the
mere nature of the relevant market.
Mutual communication among competitors can also occur in a Hub and
Spoke situation,87 where a non-competitor assists with the facilitation of horizontal
collusion, for instance, where the same algorithms, which are used by a platform
connecting numerous competitors directly, leads to parallel behaviour. The plat-
form acts as an intermediate entity at the diagonal or vertical level. Similarly, a
number of competitors could use the same software to determine, for instance,
their future prices.
One way of understanding the role of such a platform in the digital world
could be to perceive it as a competitors’ meeting place. In the non-digital
environment, the typical way of exchanging information which can lead to
collusion is through industry associations and other meetings of the industry.88
Nowadays, exchange of information can be digitalized and can occur via platforms.
On the other side of the spectrum is the use of algorithms in a similar fashion
to unilateral business decision-making in oligopolies, where the nature of the
86 This was the case in Wood Pulp II, ECLI:EU:C:1993:120. See discussion in Part III.
87 One of the recent examples of the Hub and Spoke scenario is the Eturas, ECLI:EU:C:2016:42.
Although it appeared in the digital world, the parallel conduct resulted from human actions rather than
algorithms themselves and their AI. This scenario is explained in, e.g. Ezrachi & Stucke, supra n. 5, at
46–50.
88 See e.g. T-35/92, John Deere Ltd v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:1994:259; T-Mobile Netherlands, ECLI:
EU:C:2009:343.
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market leads to parallel behaviour without the existence of collusion. For instance,
if one software program is used purely by one individual competitor for its own
independent business decision-making, even if the software follows the price of
another competitor and, indeed, assists with leading to parallel pricing, this
amounts to unilateral conduct only. Such unilateral conduct is legal if it occurs
in the oligopolistic market, whereas the situation in the digital world differs
because of the characteristics of the algorithms. Algorithms can be constructed to
substitute unilateral strategic business decisions by utilizing, for example, economic
game theories. However, this differs from an oligopoly in that algorithms have an
artificial character because they replace human actions and, in some situations, also
human decision-making by AI embodied in algorithms. The artificial character
means that the conduct is not as independent as they are in the non-digital world,
where all of the decisions are made directly by humans. This is because algorithms
increase transparency and interdependency within digital ecosystems in a way that
did not exist prior to the digital age. The artificial character also does not constitute
the normal conditions of a market, as it is different from unilateral human
decision-making in individual cases caused by humans observing the markets.
It is not humans but algorithms that collect and evaluate the information and
make decisions about business conduct. They provide sophisticated means to
allow for these functions to occur. This would be impossible without these
means and prior to the digital age; humans are not capable of achieving these
feats on their own. The artificial nature of the algorithm could lead to new rules,
stretch liability and, in particular, establish legal bases for changing algorithms in
order to avoid parallel behaviour, as discussed in the next part ‘Liability’. This
would, most likely, require a change of law.
5 LIABILITY
We have seen that in digital polyopolies it is the algorithms that cause parallel
behaviour by subsidizing human actions and decision-making. This lack of human
involvement represents a new feature for the purposes of competition law. Under
traditional competition law, liability arises from human decision-making and
actions, which involves various degrees of intent and, in the case of concerted
practice, the existence of an offer and an acceptance, which can have their tacit
forms. This human decision-making is usually assigned to specific economic
entities. Algorithms, which constitute digital polyopolies, change the decision-making
process and actions due to their artificial character, and it is this artificial character that
can prove problematic for attributing culpability in two ways: in (1) the subject and (2)
the object or aim of the particular algorithm(s).
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Looking at the subject element, algorithms can have their own artificial
‘autonomy’. This artificial autonomy is not the same as human autonomy because,
in order to conceptualize algorithms, human judgments are necessary. Taking into
consideration the master-slave metaphor, a robot, in the case of digital polyopolies,
algorithms, will do whatever its master allows it to do. The master-slave metaphor
applies to all forms of algorithms, despite whether the autonomy can be detected.
If specific algorithms have established autonomy, their artificial autonomy origi-
nated in initial, human decision-making by their ‘master’. This ‘master’ element
broadens the scope of persons who should or could be liable for anticompetitive
digital polyopolies. Put simply, behind every algorithm is a coder, behind every
coder is an instructor and/or a manager who gives instructions on what the
algorithms have to do. The instructor could be, but does not have to be, the
owner.89
From the object point of view, the principal question for determining
anti-competitiveness, as well as the liability of a particular digital polyopoly, is
what the aim of a specific algorithm is: whether their aim is to collude or to
compete. For instance, one must consider whether the algorithm that determines
prices was designed to determine competitive prices or whether it was designed to
match the prices of competitors and thus not compete on price. This leads us to the
essential element of liability: knowledge.90 In particular, it must be determined: (1)
whose knowledge it is, which takes us back to the subject of attributing culpability;
and (2) the degree of this knowledge, which is associated with the object of
attributing culpability.
By applying the degree of knowledge of the conduct to a digital polyopoly,
algorithms can facilitate parallel behaviour in three general forms: the algorithm is
designed to create collusion; it is reasonable to predict that the algorithm can lead
to collusion (although it was designed for a different purpose); or the algorithm
leads to collusion ‘accidently’ without the existence of a reasonable prediction. In
other words, what has to be considered is whether the aim was to facilitate
collusion; if not, whether it was predictable that it could have led to collusion or
whether it led to collusion accidently or due to AI (machine learning) without the
existence of a reasonable prediction.
The first scenario, where the algorithm is designed to facilitate collusion,
encompasses clear knowledge and a likely intention. It can be competitors them-
selves who use the algorithm in order to collude, and create and maintain parallel
89 Who can be liable depends on particular situations, some of which are discussed below.
90 In the EU, a concerted practice arises where the parties ‘knowingly substitute a practical co-operation
between them for the risks of competition’: Dyestuffs, ECLI:EU:C:1972:70, para. 64 (emphasis added).
It might be enough that the entities in question ought to be aware of the collusion or part of it (the offer
to collude). See e.g. Eturas ECLI:EU:C:2016:42, paras 29, 50.
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conduct. However, it does not have to be the competitors’ algorithm(s). Taking
into consideration the existence of ecosystems in the digital world, it can be a
platform’s algorithm which leads to collusion, with the platform entity having the
knowledge that the algorithm is set in such a way as to create and maintain
anticompetitive collusion. Primarily, competitors should be liable for horizontal
collusion. However, this situation in the digital ecosystem involves a platform and
its algorithms causing parallel conduct. Thus the platform should be held liable.
The EU allows for an independent entity, which is not a competitor or a supplier
or buyer, in this case a platform, to be held liable under Article 101 TFEU, if it is
involved in the anticompetitive conduct in question.91 For an entity not in a
horizontal or vertical relationship with others to be held liable, it is enough if it
‘contributed to its implementation, even in a subsidiary, accessory, or passive role,
for example, by tacitly approving the cartel and by failing to report it to the
administrative authorities’.92 And it must be in agreement, at least tacitly, with the
objectives of the conduct in question.93
The second scenario involves situations where the algorithm(s) was not designed to
lead to collusion but it is reasonably foreseeable that it could. This leads to the question as
to by whom it can or should be foreseen. The platform example used in this article
points at three different entities: first, the competitors involved in the parallel conduct;
second, the platform using the specific algorithm; and, finally, the designer of the
algorithm. Indeed, the platform can design the algorithm itself, for instance Google
designs its own algorithms. However, sometimes an IT firm may design the algorithm
for the platform or, most likely, for one or all of the competitors involved in the parallel
behaviour. It could be one or all of the entities who could reasonably foresee that
the algorithm could lead to anticompetitive collusion. In situations where a firm uses an
IT firm to create specific algorithms which would subsidize or assist its business
decision-making, it most likely does not have the technical capacity and knowledge to
do it itself. Under the first scenario, it would ask for algorithms to assist its antic-
ompetitive conduct, but under the second scenario it would not. The question is who
should have the capability to reasonably predict that these algorithms could potentially
lead to anticompetitive conduct. The IT firm has the technical knowledge and by
creating these algorithms it should know that it could lead to anticompetitive conduct,
whereas the ordering party does not necessarily have the technical knowledge for such a
91 For instance, a consultancy firm can be held liable for conduct taking place in a different relevant
market as was decided in AC-Treuhand, EU:C:2015:717, paras 9, 30–43; AC-Treuhand [2008] ECR
II-1501, para. 119. This, indeed, involves also all hub and spoke participants. See e.g. T-379/10 and T-
381/10 Keramag Keramishe Werke and Others v. Commission [2013]EU:T:2013:457, para. 19, appeal
Case C-613/13 P, Keramag Keramishe Werke.
92 AC-Treuhand [2008] ECR II-1501, para. 133; see also AC-Treuhand v. Commission, EU:C:2015:717,
para. 31.
93 Ibid., para. 30.
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prediction. In some cases, the instructions could be such that the reasonable prediction of
potential anticompetitive conduct could follow from them.
Who should be liable and who would be liable under current competition law
are two different questions. The IT firms, having the technical knowledge, should
be liable as they should reasonably predict that such anticompetitive conduct could
occur, while the ordering party would not always have the capacity to do so. The
way the current competition law, such as the EU competition regime, is set, IT
firms as contractors are not, necessarily, efficiently forced to know competition law
and take potential anticompetitive conduct into consideration when designing
algorithms for their clients. However, for competition law to tackle digital poly-
opolies effectively, the law should find all entities with that presumed knowledge
liable, including the IT firm, under the principle of ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
The most difficult scenario for an entity to be held liable under competition
law occurs when an algorithm de facto leads to parallel conduct by accident or due
to AI without anyone being reasonably aware that the algorithm could have led to
such conduct.94 The difficulty is encompassed in the fact that this scenario does not
contain the element of knowledge. This is also a problem in the EU regime, which
requires some degree of knowledge in order to establish liability. In particular, the
CJEU confirmed the existence of liability under EU competition law in situations
where there is direct knowledge of anticompetitive conduct and also where the
entity in question should have known, in other words, where they could have
reasonably foreseen the anticompetitive conduct.95
Indeed, it is difficult to justify liability in a situation where there is no knowledge.
Nevertheless, given the artificial nature of the decision-making provided by algo-
rithms, the law could potentially require a change to the algorithm(s), such as changing
its parameters, in order to stop the digital polyopoly without holding anyone liable for
the polyopoly itself. Only if the algorithms concerned are not subsequently changed
could liability be established. This would most likely require a change of law in order
to effectively adapt competition law to competition in the digital economy.
6 CONCLUSION
A digital polyopoly is parallel conduct set up and maintained by algorithms in the
digital world. The digital environment created by algorithms shares two essential
features with oligopolistic markets: transparency and interdependency. At the same
time, digital polyopolies differ from oligopolies in that an oligopolistic market is
characterized by high concentration, which, together with other features, can
94 Other scholars also acknowledge this possibility. See e.g. Harrington, supra n. 68, at 29–30.
95 See Anic Partecipazioni, EU:C:1999:356, para. 87.
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facilitate parallel conduct. Parallel conduct in digital polyopolies, on the other
hand, occurs with or without a concentration of the market.
Algorithms are the essential elements of the digital world. Given that they transmit,
exchange and analyse information, they represent forms of communication that are
artificial in nature, and replace, or can replace, human decision-making. They create
conditions different to the normal, pre-digital-age conditions in the market. The
perception that they provide communication and/or communicate amongst themselves,
allows existing competition law to tackle some digital polyopolies under existing legal
concepts, such as ‘concerted practice’ in EU competition law. Therefore, there is no
absolute necessity to rewrite competition law and policy rules on anticompetitive
collusion. However, these do need to be adapted to the new situations that digital
polyopolies present for competition and law, and potentially new legal tools and rules
could be introduced in order to prohibit and tackle all forms of digital polyopolies.
The interpretation of competition law is key for its effective application and
enforcement regarding digital polyopolies. The way the digital economy has been
evolving indicates that humans will be able to make algorithms evenmore sophisticated
and autonomous and the usage of algorithms in business conduct will become more
and more common. Digital polyopolies will, most likely, become more common too,
unless sufficiently tackled by law and effective enforcement. Therefore, if competition
law is interpreted and enforced in a way that will allow, and not prohibit, their
existence, digital polyopolies will represent a great opportunity for firms to maximize
their profit, not by being more competitive but by restricting competition. Enforcers
need to be prepared, as this is already happening and the area is developing rapidly.
Competition law and effective enforcement also need to address one of the greatest
challenges of the digital world for law in general: establishing liability. In that regard,
digital polyopolies involve two key challenges for establishing liability under competition
law. The first one is the artificial character of algorithms and the related lack of human
involvement in digital polyopolies. The second encompasses the fact that other entities,
such as platforms and IT firms, and not only direct competitors, are linked to the
ownership and knowledge of the functions of particular algorithms creating digital
polyopolies.
Digital algorithms are changing the world we live in, including the way business
is conducted. It is about time that the law and its enforcement catch up with this
reality. Indeed, the effective enforcement of law in the digital economy needs to go
beyond traditional means. It needs to include innovative tools which will keep up with
the highly dynamic digital world where, for instance, prices can be changed by
algorithms many times a day. If private entities use algorithms, it is time for competi-
tion authorities to be allowed to use their own algorithms to detect parallel conduct
and, potentially, even correct situations where parallel conduct occurs in the digital
world. This should not be the realm of science-fiction but the next future reality.
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